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In spite of some progress, which has been 
achieved in recent years, gender discrimi-
nation of women is still a problem, even in 
relatively modern countries (OECD 2013). 
Among others there are still “invisible ceil-
ings” to women’s professional careers, which 
result in an overrepresentation of men at the 
higher ranks of many private or public orga-
nizations. This article aims at comparing and 
explaining the extent of the problem in differ-
ent European countries.
In order to tackle the first of these goals, 
i.e. a comparative description of the current 
gender inequalities, the author introduces a 
set of social indicators based on information 
theory (Shannon and Weaver 1962; Mathar 
1996; Stone 2015), which offers for this pur-
pose two major advantages: (i) it allows to 
explore the relations between these inequal-
ity-indicators by pure, precise mathematical 
reasoning; (ii) it offers for the mentioned in-
dicators a common unit of measurement, i.e. 
the bit. Both advantages facilitate compari-
sons between countries as well as between 
different social indicators.
The explanation of gender inequality 
– which is the second goal of this article – 
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is based on the analysis of welfare regimes, 
as originally proposed by Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 74). Welfare regimes define among 
others the role of the state, the family, and 
especially of the women in the production of 
welfare for the aged, the young, and the frail. 
Moreover they mirror the societal principles 
of the attribution of privileges and their cor-
rection by the state in order to maintain dis-
tributive justice. Thus it makes sense to use 
the type of the national welfare regime for 
explaining country-specific gender inequali-
ties.
INEQUALITY MEASURES 
fROM INfORMATION
THEORY
On the basis of conventional inequality-
indicators, there is hardly any commensura-
bility between the inequality of a privilege 
distribution and the inequality of the group-
specific opportunities for getting access to 
these privileges. The first of the mentioned 
concepts is generally measured by GINI-
indices or inter-quartile ranges (Mitchell 
1993: chap. 6; Coulter 1989: chap.3), 
whereas the second is often operationalized 
by measures describing the dissimilarity of 
group-specific privilege-distributions like 
chi-square (Everitt 2006: 76) or the Duncan 
Index of Dissimilarity (Coulter 1989: chap. 
7). In order to increase the comparability 
between the mentioned two concepts, the 
author proposed in an earlier article to use 
entropy-measures from information theory 
(Mueller 2004).
In information theory (Mathar 1996), 
entropy is usually defined as 1
 H = - Σi = 1...n [pi * ld(pi)] (1a)
where p1, p2, p3, ... are the relative frequencies 
of the categories i = 1, 2, 3, ... of a population 
attribute. If the attribute is a privilege with 
only two levels P = low and P = high and the 
respective population shares plo and phi , the 
previous formula (1a) becomes
 H = - [ plo * ld(plo) + phi * ld(phi) ]  (1b)
Thus, if everyone is at the same privilege-
level, i.e. either P = low or P = high, formula 
(1b) yields H = 0 2, which corresponds to the 
minimum of entropy or uncertainty about the 
privileges of a stranger, randomly chosen 
from a totally equal society. If the analyzed 
population is uniformly distributed over the 
privilege categories P = low and P = high, the 
respective probabilities plo and phi are both 
equal to 1/2 and the entropy reaches the value 
H=1 3 (see Figure 1). In this case we have a 
maximum of entropy or uncertainty about the 
privileges in a totally unequal society. The 
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figure 1. The Correspondence between IQR and H for Different Privilege Distributions
Note:  Hi/lo privilege split = plo = share of persons with P = low = 0; phi = 1-plo = share of persons with 
P = high = 1; IQR = Interquartile range;  H = Entropy = Inequality as defined by formula (1b).
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value H for this type of society varies with 
the number n of privilege categories and is 
equal to -ld(1/n).
All in all there is a positive correlation 
between the inequality of privileges and the 
associated entropy H. Figure 1 illustrates 
this regularity by comparisons between the 
traditional interquartile range IQR (Everitt 
2006: 202) and the proposed entropy measure 
H for different splits between P = lo and P 
= hi. As compared to the IQR, the entropy 
measure H has the advantage that it is also 
applicable to simple scales, which measure 
privileges not at the ratio- but rather at the 
interval- or ordinal-level. In this respect 
H outperforms also the Theil-Index (Theil 
1972: 99,100; Wikipedia 2016), which is 
too based on entropy concepts but requires 
“good” scales for calculating mean privileges 
that are for Theil often mean incomes.
If formula (1b) is applied to a whole 
population, H is the total inequality with 
regard to a privilege P. It may however also 
be applied to subpopulations, like e.g. men 
or women. In the latter case the calculated 
entropy is the female intra-gender inequality 
Hf , i.e. the inequality exclusively among 
women. In the former case there is an 
analogous concept Hm, i.e. the male intra-
gender inequality. The synthesis of the two is 
the so-called intra gender-inequality
 Hm+f = pm * Hm + pf * Hf (2)
where pm and pf are the respective male and 
female population shares. Thus Hm+f is the 
weighted mean of male and female intra-
gender inequality. In information theory, Hm+f 
is also called conditional entropy (Mathar 
1996: 27).
figure 2. Transinformation of Gender for Different Shares of Men and Women with Higher Privileges 4
The differences (H-Hm) and (H-Hf) are 
in this context in so far of special interest as 
they describe the change of uncertainty and 
information about the related privileges that 
results from additional knowledge about the 
male or the female gender of a person. The 
weighted sum
 T = pm * (H-Hm  ) + pf * (H-Hf  ) (3)
is thus the average information gain for 
both gender groups with the respective 
population shares pm and pf. In information 
theory T corresponds to the concept of 
transinformation.5 For mathematical reasons 
it always varies between the lower limit 
0 and the upper limit H (Mathar 1996: 
33, proposition b)). If T = 0, there is no 
information about privileges that can be 
gained from the knowledge of the gender of a 
person. The closer T is to its upper limit, the 
more information we get from the knowledge 
of gender. Consequently we consider T as a 
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measure of the inequality of opportunities of 
the two sexes. According to Figure 2 this is a 
reasonable interpretation: the higher the % of 
women with high privileges, the lower is the 
transinformation T. Similarly, if the share of 
the privileged men decreases, e.g. from 50% 
to 20%, women are according to Figure 2 less 
discriminated: the privilege gap between the 
two gender gets smaller and the indicator T 
mirrors this situation correctly. 
Obviously there is not only an information 
gain from gender about privileges. Similarly 
there are also information gains and losses Tlo 
and Thi resulting from the knowledge of low 
figure 3. The Interdependence of the Entropy-Based Inequality Concepts
and high privilege-ranks with regard to the 
“typical” gender of these positions. 6 It can be 
shown 7 that the inequality of opportunities T 
is a weighted sum of these information gains 
and losses
 T = plo * Tlo + phi * Thi (4)
where plo and phi are the respective shares 
of high and low ranking privilege positions. 
Equation (4) suggests to interpret Tlo and 
Thi as the privilege-specific inequality of 
opportunities for the lower and higher 
privilege-positions.
The previously mentioned inequality 
(Mathar 1996: 33, proposition b)):
 0 ≤ T ≤ H (5)
raises questions about the “nature” of the 
gap (H-T). Since H is the total inequality, the 
component (H-T) is likely to be some kind of 
more specific inequality. As formal reasoning 
proofs it is indeed a form of inequality, which 
we already encountered before: the intra-
gender inequality Hm+f. Thus the following 
equation 8
 H = T + Hm+f (6)
holds, meaning that total inequality of 
privileges H is the sum of the inequality 
of opportunities T and the intra-gender 
inequality Hm+f.
9 According to equation (4), T 
can be further decomposed into the privilege-
specific inequalities of opportunities Tlo and 
Thi. Similarly, equation (2) has shown that 
intra-gender inequality Hm+f has male and 
female components Hm and Hf. Figure 3 
gives a visual summary of the mathematical 
interdependences of the mentioned concepts.
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WELfARE REGIMES ANd
THEIR GENdER POLICIES
As recent statistics show (OECD 2013: chap. 
15, 16), there are still invisible ceilings to 
women’s professional careers, which entail 
that the share of women in supervisory 
positions is generally lower than the 
corresponding share of the male workforce 
(LeFeuvre 2010: 134). This inequality of 
opportunities has to do with continuing 
time- and role-conflicts between professional 
careers and female family obligations 
as care-givers for the younger and older 
generation (Kan and Gershuny 2010; Chafetz 
1991: chap. 2). Hence there is a direct link 
to the services and regulations of the welfare 
state, which may in the best case reconcile 
and in the worst accentuate this role-conflict. 
In the first case the welfare state organizes 
and subsidizes day nurseries and homes for 
the elderly, whereas in the second it obliges 
families and especially women to take not 
only care of their children but also of their 
retired parents (Daly and Rake 2003, Meyers 
et al. 1999).
Currently there are many different 
welfare state typologies (Gelissen 2002: chap. 
2), some of them are better known, others 
less. In what follows, we are going to use 
the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990: 74), 
which has also been applied to the analysis of 
gender-relations, as e.g. in Sainsbury (1999a). 
It has the advantage of being a continuous 
and not a classical partitioning typology: 
thus a welfare regime may e.g. be a mix of 
socialism and liberalism, where the degree 
of socialism and liberalism depends on the 
country and historical period. Consequently 
it is possible to use regression analysis for 
investigating also small data-sets with only 
a limited number of countries, what would 
not be possible with a partitioning typology. 
The three basic dimensions, which constitute 
this continuous typology of Esping-Andersen 
are the degrees of (1) conservatism, (2) 
liberalism, and (3) socialism. 
Conservative regimes consider the 
traditional family as the primary unit 
of society, which is responsible for the 
well-being of its weaker members. The 
conservative welfare state assumes only a 
subsidiary role for cases, where the traditional 
family fails. Under conservative regimes 
women are considered as the care-givers for 
their children and frail parents and thus have 
to sacrifice their professional careers for the 
sake of the family members in need (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 27; Gelissen 2002: 31). 
Since this expectation exists to a much lesser 
degree for men, we hypothesize that
the more conservative a welfare regime, 
the higher the inequality of opportunities 
between men and women on the lower 
(hypothesis 1a), the higher (hypothesis 1b) 
and both (hypothesis 1c) ranks of privileges. 
Moreover, conservative regimes tend to 
maintain and perpetuate existing privileges, 
especially after the transition to retirement. 
This points to a general legitimacy of 
inequality and suggests the following four 
hypotheses:
The more conservative a welfare regime, the 
higher the intra-gender inequality among 
men (hypothesis 2a), women (hypothesis 
2b) and for both sexes (hypothesis 2c) and 
the higher the total inequality of privileges 
(hypothesis 2d).
Liberal regimes have weak states, 
which do not intervene into markets in order 
to correct the inequalities, which are created 
by these markets. In particular, they avoid 
redistributive taxes and public expenditures 
for underprivileged groups (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 26-27; Gelissen 2002: 31). 
Consequently we postulate that
the more liberal a welfare regime, the higher 
the intra-gender inequality among men 
(hypothesis 3a), women (hypothesis 3b) and 
for both sexes (hypothesis 3c) and the higher 
the total inequality of privileges (hypothesis 
3d).
However, liberal regimes also have a 
certain preference for meritocratic privilege 
distribution, which implies equal pay for 
equal performance (O’Connor 1999). With 
regard to the inequality of opportunities 
between men and women, this principle 
neutralizes the general tendency of these 
regimes to accept market forces, which tend 
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to increase inequalities. Hence we postulate 
that
there is no correlation between the degree 
of liberalism of a welfare regime and the 
inequality of opportunities between men and 
women on the lower (hypothesis 4a), the 
higher (hypothesis 4b) and both (hypothesis 
4c) ranks of privileges. 
Socialist regimes 10 have strong 
interventionist states, which use their 
political and economic power in order to 
correct every kind of inequality or injustice 
created by market forces (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 27–28; Gelissen 2002: 31–32). Hence 
there are laws to ensure gender equality as 
well as public expenditures for day nurseries 
and similar institutions, which promote 
women’s careers at work. Consequently we 
postulate that
the more socialist a welfare regime, the lower 
is any kind of inequality, i.e. the intra-gender 
inequality among men (hypothesis 5a), women 
(hypothesis 5b) and both sexes (hypothesis 
5c), the inequality of opportunities between 
men and women on the lower (hypothesis 
5d), the higher (hypothesis 5e) and both 
(hypothesis 5f) ranks of privileges, as well as 
the total inequality of privileges (hypothesis 
5g).
dATA ANd OPERATIONALI-
ZATIONS
In order to compare countries and types of 
welfare regimes, we need country specific 
data about regime types and gender related 
inequalities. Regarding the first type of 
information, we use in this article an update of 
the original regime classification of Esping-
Andersen (1990: 74), which was published by 
Scruggs and Allen (2008). It locates welfare 
regimes in a three-dimensional continuous 
regime-space with two 0 to 8 scales for the 
degrees of socialism and conservatism and 
a 0 to 12 scale for the degree of liberalism. 
Regarding the second type of information, 
i.e. the gender-related inequalities, we are 
relying on the European Values Study EVS 
(2008). Its questionnaire asked in a great 
number of European countries respondents 
with a job, whether they had at their 
workplace supervisory functions or not (see 
EVS-variable V341): no supervision of others 
was considered as a low privilege ranking, at 
least 1 supervised person as an indication of 
high ranking. Hence it is possible to describe 
the country- and gender-specific statistical 
privilege distributions with regard to the 
hierarchical positions at work, which is in 
turn the basis for calculating the entropy-
based indicators presented in Table 1. These 
indicators are in so far meaningful for gender 
Table 1.  Entropy Data of Gender Inequalities
Country Intra-gender inequality: Ineq. of opportunities:  Total in-
equalitymale female total lo rank hi rank total
Austria .952 .728 .823 .035 .001 .025 .849
Belgium .954 .655 .807 .011 .112 .039 .847
Denmark .967 .800 .880 .015 .027 .019 .899
Finland .830 .620 .722 .006 .040 .013 .734
France 1.000 .860 .924 .040 .021 .033 .957
Germany .930 .732 .825 .015 .026 .018 .843
Ireland .847 .704 .763 .015 -.021 .007 .769
Italy .965 .665 .812 .020 .103 .043 .855
Netherlands .998 .788 .883 .070 .058 .066 .949
Norway .985 .855 .920 .011 .030 .018 .938
Sweden .914 .691 .789 .023 .010 .020 .808
Switzerland .996 .840 .912 .034 .022 .030 .941
UK .955 .803 .865 .030 -.024 .014 .879
Note: Bold: highest value of an indicator. Underlined: Lowest value of an indicator.
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inequality as they refer not only to the intrinsic 
discrimination by career blockage but also to 
discriminatory causes and consequences of 
hierarchical “glass-ceilings”. Among others 
they are related to the unequal distribution of 
housework and child-care between husband 
and wife and explain the lower average 
salaries of the female workforce. Due to 
the limited number of countries coded by 
Scruggs and Allen (2008) and the exclusion 
of Non-European nations from the European 
Values Survey EVS (2008), the dataset of 
this article comprises in the end only a rather 
small number of 13 countries (see Table 1).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Intra-gender Inequalities
As summarized in Figure 3, there are three 
measures of intra-gender inequality, which 
can be deduced from information theory: 
female intra-gender inequality Hf , i.e. the 
inequality among women with regard to 
higher positions at work; male intra-gender 
inequality Hm, the analogous measure for 
men; intra-gender inequality Hm+f, i.e. 
a gender-weighted sum of the previous 
indicators.
The boxplots of Figure 4 show the 
median values and the spread of the three 
measures for the 13 European countries 
mentioned in Table 1. The country-data for 
men are homogeneous and rather high – with 
two exceptions: Finland and Ireland, which 
appear in Figure 4 as outliers. Intra-gender 
inequality among women is much lower 
than among men and displays more inter-
country variability than Hm: women occupy 
rather the lower than the higher hierarchical 
positions and are thus more equal than men. 
However, in some but not all of the countries 
they moved up to higher positions such that 
the inter-country variability is increased. The 
intra-gender inequality Hm+f for both gender-
groups is by definition a mix of the tendencies 
observed for male and female intra-gender 
inequality. According to Figure 4, this holds 
figure 4.  Boxplots of the Different Forms of Gender Inequality
Note: Interpretation of boxplots: Top of box: 3rd quartile; bottom of box: 1st quartile; horizontal line in 
the middle of the box: median; top whisker: highest case in the interval [3rd quartile , 3rd quartile + 
1.5 * interquartile range]; bottom whisker: lowest case in the interval [1st quartile , 1st quartile - 
1.5 * interquartile range]; top circles: outliers above the top whisker; bottom circles: outliers below the 
bottom whisker.
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true for the median as well as for the spread of 
the data, which are both between the gender 
inequalities of men and women.
On the grounds of the r-squares of Table 
2, regression analysis allows to explain all 
three forms of intra-gender inequalities by 
means of the mentioned regime variables of 
Esping-Andersen. However, the relatively 
high explanatory power of these variables 
requires the exclusion of the outlier Finland 
(see Figure 4). Moreover, not all of the 
previously mentioned hypotheses are 
confirmed in Table 2: the degree of socialism 
reduces only the intra-gender inequality 
of men but not of women and both gender-
groups, such that the hypotheses 5b and 5c 
are not corroborated. This may have to do 
with the fact that labor unions as the usual 
allies of socialist welfare regimes are male 
dominated and less interested in the concerns 
of women (Sainsbury 1999b). Fortunately, 
the remaining hypotheses 3a,b,c and 2a,b,c 
about the negative effects of liberal and 
conservative regimes on all forms of intra-
gender inequalities have been confirmed.
Inequalities of Opportunities
As demonstrated earlier in this article, 
transinformation T is a proxy for the 
inequality of opportunities between men and 
women, which can further be decomposed 
in two components: the gains/losses of 
information Tlo  and Thi about the gender of 
an anonymous person, if his/her low or high 
professional rank is being disclosed (see 
Figure 3). For 13 European countries, the 
median and dispersion of all these indicators 
are presented in the boxplots of Figure 5.
The inequality of opportunities is for 
low professional ranks always positive and 
has a rather limited extension. Women are at 
these ranks in all countries overrepresented 
and since there is generally only limited 
political interest in changing the situation, 
European countries are very similar and have 
positive values Tlo. This is in sharp contrast 
to the inequality of opportunities at higher 
ranks Thi , where the dispersion between the 
maximum and the minimum as well as the 
interquartile range are much higher. In certain 
cases (UK and Ireland) the values Thi are even 
negative und thus contribute to a reduction 
of the total inequality of opportunities. The 
different gender policies of the European 
countries probably explain this diversity of 
the inequality of opportunities at the higher 
professional ranks. Since the weight phi of 
the higher ranks in the total inequality of 
opportunities T is rather small as compared 
Table 2.  Standardized Beta-values of Regime-types for the Explanation of Intra-gender Inequalities by Linear 
Regression
Dependent
variables
Sample Deg. of
socialism
Deg. of 
conservatism
Deg. of
liberalism
Adj.
r-square
Intra-gender Full [-0.412] [-0.114] [0.050] [0.000]
inequality: Excl. Finland -0.518* 0.484* 0.569* 0.489*
Male - + +
Intra-gender Full [-0.150] [-0.030] [0.456] [0.000]
inequality: Excl. Finland [-0.157] 0.465* 0.910** 0.542*
Female Excl. Finland ... 0.510* 0.912** 0.565**
- + +
Intra-gender Full [-0.275] [-0.042] [0.332] [0.000]
inequality: Excl. Finland [-0.316] 0.534* 0.865** 0.608**
Total Excl. Finland ... 0.624* 0.869** 0.539**
- + +
Note: Significances (1-tailed t-test): ***: 0.1%, **: 1%, *: 5%, [ ]: n.s.; Expected signs: +: Pos., -: Neg., o: No effect; 
... : Variable not included; Bold: Final model; Adj. r-square: Adjusted r-square; Excl. Finland: Finland as an outlier 
excluded from regressions due to lowest intra-gender inequalities (see Table 1).
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figure 5.  Boxplots of the Different Forms of the Inequality of Opportunities
Note: See note of Figure 4.
Table 3. Standardized Beta-values of Regime-types for the Explanation of the Inequalities of Opportunities by Linear 
Regression
Dependent
variables
Sample Deg. of
socialism
Deg. of 
conservatism
Deg. of
liberalism
Adj.
r-square
Ineq. of opp.: Full [-0.481] [-0.331] [-0.089] [0.000]
Low ranks Excl. Netherl. [-0.545] [-0.146] [0.015] [0.000]
Excl. Netherl. [-0.501] ... [0.062] [0.082]
Excl. Netherl. -0.495* ... ... 0.170*
- + o
Ineq. of opp.: Full [-0.287] [ 0.009] [-0.305] [0.000]
High ranks Excl. Belgium [-0.559] [-0.128] [-0.133] [0.053]
Excl. Belgium -0.520 ... [-0.102] [0.142]
Excl. Belgium -0.536* ... ... 0.216*
- + o
Ineq. of opp.: Full -0.540* [-0.291] [-0.319] [0.139]
Total Full [-0.461] ... [-0.229] [0.142]
Full -0.483* ... ... 0.163*
- + o
Note: Significances (1-tailed t-test with rounded error probabilities): ***: 0.1%, **: 1%, *: 5%, [ ]: n.s.;  Expected signs: +: 
Pos., -: Neg., o: No effect;  ... : Variable not included;  Bold: Final model;  Adj. r-square: Adjusted r-square; Excl. Belgium: 
Belgium as an outlier excluded from regression due to the highest inequality of opportunities for high ranking jobs (see Table 
1). Excl. Netherl.: Netherlands as an outlier excluded from regression due to the highest inequality of opportunities for low 
ranking jobs (see Table 1).
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to plo (see formula (4)), T has a statistical 
distribution that is very close to the inequality 
of opportunities of the lower ranks Tlo.
In order to explain the different 
inequalities of opportunities by linear 
regression, we had to remove from some 
of the analyses of Table 3 outliers like the 
Netherlands or Belgium (see Figure 5). In 
terms of the r-squares, the result is acceptable 
(see Table 3), but not as good as for intra-
gender inequality (see Table 2). Moreover not 
all of the hypotheses about the effects of the 
regime variables are confirmed by the data: 
contrary to the hypotheses 1a,b,c the effects 
of conservative regimes on the different 
forms of inequalities of opportunities are 
not positive but neutral (see Table 3) – 
where the reasons for these anomalies are 
not clear. The regression coefficients of the 
liberal regimes are according to Table 3 not 
significant and had to be dropped in order to 
make the final model statistically acceptable. 
Hence the coefficients of Table 3 correspond 
to the hypotheses 4a,b,c, which postulate for 
liberalism a no-effect situation. Finally, the 
negative signs of the corresponding beta-
values of Table 3 also show that all forms of 
inequalities of opportunities are reduced by 
the presence of a socialist welfare regime, as 
predicted by the hypotheses 5d,e,f.
Total Inequality
According to the synoptic Figure 3, the 
entropy H describes the total inequality of 
the privilege distribution, which has in turn 
two additive components: the intra-gender 
inequality Hm+f of both gender-groups and 
their inequality of opportunities T. The 
boxplots in Figure 6 show the statistical 
properties of the three indicators: total 
inequality is generally quite close to the 
theoretical maximum 1 and the inter-country 
variation is rather small. The main component 
of total inequality is intra-gender inequality, 
whereas the inequality of opportunities is 
comparatively low. This means that the 
inequality between the employees of an 
average national labor market is mainly 
influenced by the hierarchies among men as 
well as among women and less by the fact 
that men and women have different chances 
for getting a higher professional position.
As in the previous Tables 2 and 3, we 
attempted to explain in Table 4 the total 
inequality H by the type welfare regime. 
figure 6. Boxplots of Total Inequality and its Components
Note: See note of Figure 4.
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The beta-coefficients of Table 4 suggest 
that socialism reduces this inequality, as 
expected earlier in hypothesis 5g. Liberalism 
has the contrary effect of increasing the total 
inequality, which corresponds to hypothesis 
3d. Table 4 falsifies only hypothesis 2d: 
conservatism has in reality not an increasing 
but a neutral effect on total inequality. In spite 
of this deficiency the final model without 
the degree of conservatism explains 36% of 
the total variance, which is in view of the 
restricted choice of the explanatory variables 
certainly not too bad.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we pursued two interdependent 
goals: On the one hand we wanted to construct 
indicators of inequality, which allow to make 
meaningful comparisons not only between 
countries but also between different forms 
of inequalities. As shown in Figure 3, we 
reached this goal relatively well: by the use 
Table 4. Standardized Beta-values of Regime-types for the Explanation of Total Inequality
Dependent
variables
Sample Deg. of
socialism
Deg. of
conservatism
Deg. of
liberalism
Adj.
r-square
Total Full [-0.368] [-0.099] [0.224] [0.000]
inequality Excl. Finland -0.431* [0.443] 0.717** 0.479*
Excl. Finland -0.530* ... 0.515* 0.364*
- + +
Note: Significances (1-tailed t-test): ***: 0.1%, **: 1%, *: 5%, [ ]: n.s.; Expected signs: +: Pos., -: Neg., o: No effect;  ... : 
Variable not included; Bold: Final model; Adj. r-square: Adjusted r-square;  Excl. Finland: Finland as an outlier excluded 
from regression due to lowest value of total inequality (see Table1).
of information theory it is possible to explore 
the interdependence of the different indicators 
of gender inequality in a mathematically 
precise way. On the other hand we wanted to 
explain gender inequalities at work by means 
of welfare regime variables. 
In order to reach the second goal of the 
article, we had to exclude from the regression 
analyses some values of Finland, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. According to Table 1, 
these three countries represent the highest or 
the lowest values of the respective dependent 
variables. In many cases, the boxplots of 
Figures 4–6 identify these countries even as 
statistical outliers. Given the small number 
of observations (N = 13) available for 
regression analyses, these outliers tended to 
destroy the full models. Consequently we 
decided to exclude these values from many 
of the calculations of Tables 2–4, although 
the reasons for these statistical anomalies are 
not always clear: the impact of the country-
specific business culture on the structure 
Table 5. The Effects of Regime-Types on Different Forms of Inequality: Theory vs. Data
Explanatory
variables:
Deg. of
socialism
Deg. of
conservatism
Deg. of
liberalism
Dependent variables Data  Theory Data  Theory Data  Theory
Intra-gender inequality: Men - - + + + +
Intra-gender inequality: Women o - + + + +
Intra-gender inequality: Total o - + + + +
Ineq. of opportunities: Lower ranks - - o + o o
Ineq. of opportunities: Higher ranks - - o + o o
Ineq. of opportunities: Total - - o + o o
Total inequality - - o + + +
% consistency of theory and data: 71% 43% 100%
Note: Signs: See expected signs (“Theory”) and beta-values (“Data”) of Tables 2 – 4.  Bold: Theory and data are 
consistent. % consistency of theory and data: % of theoretical expectations, which are confirmed by the data.
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of professional hierarchies is perhaps an 
explanation.
After excluding the mentioned extreme 
values, our hypotheses about the effects of 
liberalism were 100% correct (see Table 5). 
It seems that we understand the functioning 
of socialist regimes also relatively well: 
here 71% of our original hypotheses were 
correct. In the remaining 29% of cases we 
failed, possibly due to the male syndicalist 
influence on socialist welfare policies. What 
we really do not understand are conservative 
regimes: more than half of our hypotheses are 
wrong. One of the possible explanations for 
this misfortune is the political change since 
the definition of these regimes by Esping-
Andersen. Nowadays there probably exists 
a modern version of these regimes, which 
follows a care policy that is less women- and 
more state-centered, with favorable effects 
on the equality of opportunities between men 
and women.
APPENdIx
Notes
1. ld = Logarithm to the base 2.
2. If everyone is P = low, then H = - [ plo*ld(plo) + phi*ld(phi)] 
= - 1*ld(1) - 0 * ld(0) = -1*0 + 0 = 0. Alternatively, if 
everyone is P = high, then H = - [ plo*ld(plo) + phi*ld(phi) ] 
= - 0*ld(0) - 1*ld(1) = 0 - 1*0 = 0.
3. If plo = phi = 1/2, then H = - [ 1/2*ld(1/2) + 1/2*ld(1/2) ] 
= - 2*1/2*ld(1/2) = (-1)*(-1) = 1.
4. Calculations based on the assumption of equal shares of 
men and women: pm = pf.
5. pm*(H-Hm) + pf*(H-Hf) = pm*H + pf*H - pm*Hm - pf*Hf = 
 (pm+pf)*H - (pm*Hm + pf*Hf) = H - (pm*Hm + pf*Hf) = 
Transinformation of gender according to definition 3.4 of 
Mathar (1996: 28), since the term (pm*Hm + pf*Hf) is just the 
conditional entropy of definition 3.3 of Mathar (1996: 27).
6. Contrary to T, which is always positive, Tlo and Thi can also 
be negative, which implies an information loss resulting 
Table 6. Raw Data About Welfare Regimes and Higher Professional Ranks
Country %-share of higher ranks among Degree of the welfare regime‘s
males females both soc. lib. cons.
Austria 37.2 20.3 27.5 4 4 8
Belgium 37.5 16.9 27.4 6 4 6
Denmark 39.4 24.3 31.5 8 10 2
Finland 26.2 15.4 20.6 4 8 8
France 49.0 28.3 37.8 2 6 8
Germany 34.5 20.5 27.1 4 6 4
Ireland 27.4 19.1 22.5 8 6 0
Italy 39.0 17.3 28.0 2 4 4
Netherlands 52.8 23.6 36.8 4 6 2
Norway 42.8 28.0 35.4 6 6 6
Sweden 32.9 18.5 24.8 6 4 2
Switzerland 46.4 26.9 35.8 2 10 0
UK 37.6 24.5 29.8 6 8 4
Note: %-share of higher ranks: % of workforce with 1 or more subordinates; soc.: Degree
of socialism; lib.: Degree of liberalism; cons.: Degree of conservatism. 
Sources: Regime types: Scruggs and Allen (2008). %-share of higher ranks: European 
Values Study EVS (2008), variable V341.
from the knowledge of ranks.
7. Proof based on Mathar (1996), p. 31, lemma 3.2b and p. 
27, definition 3.3:
 plo*Tlo + phi*Thi = plo*(H‘-H‘lo) + phi*(H‘-H‘hi) = 
 (plo+phi)*H‘ - [plo*H‘lo + phi *H‘hi] = H‘ - [plo*H‘lo + phi*H‘hi] 
= T,  
 where H‘ is the entropy of the gender distribution and 
H‘lo and H‘hi are the respective entropies of the gender 
distribution of the low- and the high-privilege positions.
8. Proof:  
 Hm+f  + T = 
 [pm*Hm + pf*Hf] + [pm*(H-Hm) + pf*(H-Hf)] =
 [pm*Hm + pf*Hf] + [pm*H - pm*Hm + pf*H - pf*Hf] =
 pm*H + pf*H = (pf + pm)*H
 = H
9. Expression (6) corresponds to the decomposition of income-
inequality into within- and between-group inequality by 
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Theil (1972: 100–102). However, Theil uses a different 
standardization of the data for calculating his entropy 
measures. Moreover, he does not interpret his between-set 
inequality as an information gain from group identification, 
which points to an inequality of opportunities, as this paper 
does when revealing the sociological meaning of T.
10. Degree of socialism refers to the original terminology of 
Esping-Andersen (1990). The related welfare regimes are 
generally not Marxist but rather social-democratic.
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